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PRECEDENTIAL 
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_____________ 
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_______________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
United States Department of Justice 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA: A-205-643-767) 
Immigration Judge: Hon. Mirlande Tadal 
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Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
February 13, 2015 
 
Before:   CHAGARES, JORDAN, and VANASKIE, Circuit 
Judges. 
 
(Filed: March 26, 2015 ) 
_______________ 
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Greg D. Mack 
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United States Department of Justice 
Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Div. 
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Ben Franklin Station 
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          Counsel for Respondent 
_______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
Hernan Gonzalez-Posadas petitions for review of an 
order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“the Board”).  
Specifically, he argues that the Board erred in affirming an 
Immigration Judge’s conclusions that he did not suffer past 
persecution on account of his sexual orientation and that he 
does not have a reasonable fear of future persecution on that 
basis.  We will deny the petition.   
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I. Background 
 
Gonzalez-Posadas, a native and citizen of Honduras, 
unlawfully entered the United States on September 28, 2012.  
He was apprehended that same day by agents of the United 
States Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) and found 
to be inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I).  He 
was therefore removed from the United States on October 26, 
2012.  On February 21, 2013, he unlawfully reentered the 
United States, and, a week later, was again apprehended by 
DHS, which issued a “Notice of Intent/Decision to Reinstate 
Prior Order.”  That Notice referred to Gonzalez-Posadas’s 
earlier order of removal and constituted the first step toward 
again sending him back to his home country.  In response, 
Gonzalez-Posadas expressed a fear of returning to Honduras.  
Soon after, the Asylum Office of the United States 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) interviewed 
him.   
 
A. Interview with USCIS 
 
Gonzalez-Posadas told the USCIS interviewer that he 
had fled Honduras for two reasons.  First, he reported that a 
gang called the “Maras”1 wanted to kill him.  He told USCIS 
that he had been extorted by the Maras several times in 
Honduras because they believed that his sister in the United 
                                              
1 The “Mara Salvatrucha” – also known as “Maras” or 
“MS-13” – is a criminal gang that reportedly operates in 
Honduras and other Central American countries.  (See A.R. at 
230 (identifying the gang as “Mara Salvatrucha” or “MS-
13”); id. at 248 (identifying the “Maras” as the “MS-13” 
gang).)   
 4 
 
States had sent him money.  He said that the gang had never 
physically harmed him but on one occasion some gang 
members confronted him with a weapon, demanded 1,500 
Lempira,2 and told him that they were going to kill him if he 
did not pay them within five days.  He acknowledged, 
however, that he did not pay them and nothing happened to 
him the next time he saw them.  The gang also attempted to 
recruit him and his cousin, but Gonzalez-Posadas refused to 
join.  When asked if he had ever gone to the police to report 
the Maras, Gonzalez-Posadas said he had done so but that his 
efforts to get help were fruitless because the police told him 
that they “didn’t have enough proof” (A.R. at 249-50), 
evidently meaning there was insufficient proof to pursue his 
particular complaint.   
 
The second reason Gonzalez-Posadas gave for fleeing 
Honduras was that his family mistreated him because they 
believed he was gay.  He told the interviewer that he is not 
gay but that people believed him to be gay.  When asked if he 
had ever been subjected to torture, he responded that he had 
because his family “humiliated” him by using homophobic 
slurs.  (Id. at 249-51.)  Gonzalez-Posadas also stated that one 
of his cousins was tied up and raped by his father for being 
gay.  In addition, Gonzalez-Posadas said he was twice raped 
as a teenager by his cousin Felipe but never told anyone about 
the rapes because Felipe threatened to hurt his mother if he 
reported them.  When asked if he had any reason to fear the 
Honduran authorities, he replied, “No.”  (Id. at 252.)   
 
                                              
2 The Lempira is the currency of Honduras and, during 
the relevant time period, 1,500 lempira was worth 
approximately 78 U.S. dollars.   
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USCIS determined that Gonzalez-Posadas had 
established a reasonable fear of persecution in Honduras and 
referred his case for a hearing before an immigration judge 
(“IJ”).     
 
B. Application for Withholding of Removal and 
  Protection 
 
Because asylum is not available to aliens who face 
reinstatement of a prior order of removal, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1231(a)(5), Gonzalez-Posadas could not seek asylum, but 
he did submit an application for withholding of removal and 
protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).   
 
In his application, he described the pattern of extortion 
and repeated attempts at recruitment to which he said the 
Maras subjected him.  He also said the Maras approached two 
of his cousins, Herlindo Hernandez and Marvin Hernandez, 
and made similar attempts to lure them into joining the gang.  
When the two refused, the gang allegedly attacked Herlindo 
with machetes.  Gonzalez-Posadas stated that, soon after 
attacking Herlindo, the Maras also tried to attack him with 
machetes, but he was able to hide for a few hours until they 
left.  He claimed that an attempt to get law enforcement to 
intervene was useless because the police were “corrupt and 
weak” and did nothing.  (A.R. at 230.)  He further claimed 
that he feared torture and death because he had refused to join 
the Maras, had reported them to the police, and was on their 
“kill” list.   
 
Gonzalez-Posadas went on in his application to say 
that he feared rape, torture, and death because he had been 
“repeatedly raped” by his cousin Felipe, whom he identified 
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as a member of the Maras and who called him “gay,” “trash,” 
a “fag,” and “worth nothing.”  (Id. at 223, 230.)  In addition, 
he said that other family members discriminated against him 
because of their perception of his sexual orientation.   
 
Finally, Gonzalez-Posadas stated that, after his first 
removal from the United States and return to Honduras, the 
Maras’ threats worsened, which led to his second effort to 
enter the United States.  He said that, three days after he left 
Honduras, the Maras shot and killed his cousin Marvin for 
refusing to join the gang, for being related to Gonzalez-
Posadas who also refused to join the gang, and in retaliation 
for Gonzalez-Posadas’s decision to report the gang to the 
police.   
 
C. Proceedings Before the IJ 
 
The application for withholding of removal and 
protection under CAT that Gonzalez-Posadas filed became 
the basis for a hearing before an IJ.  At that hearing, when 
asked on direct examination what his sexual orientation was, 
Gonzalez-Posadas replied, “I’m gay.”  (Id. at 115.)  When 
asked if he had ever been subjected to any harsh treatment 
because of being gay, Gonzalez-Posadas replied, “Yes.”  (Id. 
at 116.)  Gonzalez-Posadas then described his first forced 
sexual encounter with Felipe, stating that, when Felipe raped 
him, he first beat him and threatened him with a knife.  
Because Felipe told Gonzalez-Posadas that he would kill him 
and his mother if he reported the rape, Gonzalez-Posadas kept 
silent about it.  Gonzalez-Posadas testified that Felipe raped 
him again a second time, after beating him and threatening 
him with a pistol, and Felipe again threatened to kill him if he 
told anyone about the rape.  Gonzalez-Posadas testified that, 
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in spite of the threats, he eventually reported the second rape 
to the police some three years later.     
 
Gonzalez-Posadas also testified that the Maras 
mistreated him by using homophobic slurs, and they 
threatened to kill him if he did not pay them.  He said that 
gang members would tell him that he had to perform oral sex 
on them, though he never did.  He also described in detail an 
incident when the Maras attempted to recruit and extort him.  
Some time after his mother died, eight armed Maras showed 
up at his house, beat him, and demanded that he join their 
gang.  When he refused to join, they told him that he had to 
pay them 1,500 Lempira on the fifth of each month or else 
they would kill him.  He attempted to escape the gang by 
moving to a different part of Honduras, but the gang found 
him after two weeks and threatened to kill him if he did not 
submit to the extortion.  He testified that he went to the police 
in November 2012 to report the Maras but was told that he 
did not have enough proof to initiate an arrest against any 
members of the gang.     
 
In his testimony, Gonzalez-Posadas gave more detail 
about his sexual orientation than he had earlier.  He stated 
that people had noted his effeminate nature since his 
childhood.  He said that when he was 18, he had a 
homosexual relationship with a friend.  He also testified about 
his decision to attend a beauty academy, saying that it had 
always been his desire to become a beautician but that 
pursuing his career had fueled the homophobic abuse he 
experienced, including from members of his family.  When 
asked why he had not told the USCIS interviewer that he was 
gay, he said that the interview had taken place too quickly 
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and that he did not feel comfortable disclosing that to the 
interviewer.   
 
Finally, Gonzalez-Posadas testified that he fled to the 
United States and feared returning to Honduras because of the 
Maras and his cousin, and that the Maras knew he had 
reported them to the police.  Gonzalez-Posadas stated that he 
feared he would be abused if he were returned to Honduras 
because the gang has a significant presence throughout the 
country.  He said, “When they find out that I’m gay I’m 
afraid that they may want to rape me again.”3  (A.R. at 141.)   
 
On cross examination, Gonzalez-Posadas testified that 
he never told anyone that Felipe had raped him on either 
occasion, and that he did not know that Felipe was a member 
of the Maras until two years after the second attack.  
Gonzalez-Posadas also stated that, during the incident with 
the Maras at his home, he was beaten, threatened with a gun, 
and subjected to homophobic slurs.  He admitted that he was 
not seriously hurt during the incident and that the gang did 
not try to recruit him, though they told him that he had to pay 
them money or else sell drugs for them.  Gonzalez-Posadas 
also said that gang members (presumably excluding Felipe) 
never sexually assaulted him in any way; instead, they “just 
[made] threats” with sexual overtones.  (A.R. at 151.)  
Gonzalez-Posadas stated that he was harassed by the Maras 
on twenty to thirty occasions.     
                                              
3 The use of the word “again” in that testimony is 
somewhat contradictory since Gonzalez-Posadas also stated 
that gang members had not sexually assaulted him.  Perhaps, 
however, it was a reference to Felipe, who, according to 
Gonzalez-Posadas, is a member of the gang.   
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On cross examination, Gonzalez-Posadas also 
provided new details about his visit to the police in November 
2012.  During that visit, he allegedly complained about 
numerous past instances of harm that he had experienced at 
the hands of the Maras.  But instead of helping him, the 
police told him not only that he did not have enough proof, 
but also that he was lying to them, and one officer took 
Gonzalez-Posadas’s written declaration and threw it in the 
garbage.  When asked why he had not shared those details in 
his application, Gonzalez-Posadas said that no one had asked 
him questions that called for them.  Finally, he testified that 
the police did not use any homophobic slurs or say anything 
about his sexuality.   
 
Along with his testimony, Gonzalez-Posadas 
submitted documentary evidence for the IJ’s consideration.  
He offered a 2012 State Department Country Report on 
Honduras, which noted that problems in Honduras included 
an “arbitrary” police force; a “corrupt[] and institutional[ly] 
weak[] justice system;” and violence and widespread 
discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender 
(“LGBT”) persons.  (A.R. at 182, 193-94, 200.)  Gonzalez-
Posadas also submitted a 2013 Human Rights Watch Report, 
which stated that, according to local human rights advocates, 
approximately 70 LGBT persons had been killed between 
September 2008 and March 2012, and that Honduran police 
were allegedly involved in some of those deaths.  The 2013 
Human Rights Watch Report and the 2012 State Department 
Country Report disclosed, however, that the government had 
established a special victims unit in the attorney general’s 
office to investigate certain crimes against LGBT persons and 
other vulnerable groups.  Gonzalez-Posadas further submitted 
a 2011 Amnesty International Report on Honduras in which 
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members of the LGBT community complained that they are 
subjected to threats and violence and that their reports to the 
police rarely yield results.   
 
Gonzalez-Posadas also proffered a March 20, 2013 
homicide report confirming that his cousin Marvin died from 
gunshot wounds.  In addition, he provided the affidavit of a 
woman who stated that she had known Gonzalez-Posadas 
since he moved away from his mother’s home to escape the 
Maras and that he continued to suffer threats, extortion, and 
homophobic harassment.  She also said that Marvin 
Hernandez was murdered by gang members and that the 
perpetrators were still free.  Finally, Gonzalez-Posadas 
submitted a translation of several questions and answers he 
had written, dated August 15, 2013, in which he described his 
profession, stating that it is uncommon for men in Honduras 
to work as hair stylists and cosmetologists and that men in 
that line of work are often harmed because of animus directed 
at them due to perceptions about their sexual orientation.  He 
said that people discriminated against him and used 
homophobic slurs because of his career choice.  Gonzalez-
Posadas stated in the document that he had never been 
attracted to females or had sex with a woman, but that he 
once had homosexual feelings for a male friend.   
 
Concluding that Gonzalez-Posadas’s credibility was 
suspect for two reasons, the IJ denied his application for 
withholding of removal and protection under the CAT.  First, 
the IJ noted that Gonzalez-Posadas’s narrative had evolved 
over time – with additional self-serving, specific details 
appearing in three successive amendments to his application 
and then in his live testimony.  Second, the IJ decided that 
Gonzalez-Posadas’s direct testimony was not consistent with 
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his application or with his cross-examination testimony, 
particularly his testimony regarding his November 2012 
interaction with the police.   
 
Regarding withholding of removal, the IJ accepted 
Gonzalez-Posadas’s assertion that he was a member of the 
social group consisting of homosexual males, but concluded 
that the events complained of, namely two unreported rapes, 
extortion by the Maras, and exposure to homophobic slurs, 
were insufficient to establish past persecution or a risk of 
future persecution on account of sexual orientation.  The IJ 
also held that the second social group in which Gonzalez-
Posadas alleged he was a member – namely, “young 
Honduran men who share experiences of repeated resistance 
to gang recruitment” – was not cognizable because it did not 
exist independent of the alleged persecution.  (Id. at 78-80.)  
Regarding protection under the CAT, the IJ determined that 
Gonzalez-Posadas did not express fear of torture by the 
Honduran government or fear that the Honduran government 
would acquiesce in his torture, and that any such claim would 
be speculative.   
 
D. Appeal to the Board 
 
Gonzalez-Posadas appealed the IJ’s decision, and the 
Board dismissed the appeal.  It concluded that the IJ had not 
committed clear error in deciding that Gonzalez-Posadas was 
not persecuted on account of his homosexuality.  More 
particularly, it concluded that the two unreported rapes did 
not constitute past persecution and that Gonzalez-Posadas had 
failed to show a clear probability that he would be persecuted 
in the future on account of his homosexuality.  The Board 
also decided that the IJ was correct in holding that the 
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proposed social group of “‘young Honduran men who have 
resisted gang recruitment’” does not have the requisite social 
distinction to qualify as a particular social group within the 
meaning of the operative statute.  (Id. at 5.)  But, the Board 
held, even if that proposed group were cognizable, Gonzalez-
Posadas had not demonstrated the required nexus between the 
harm he feared and his status within that group.  Finally, the 
Board agreed that any sincere fear of harm or torture harbored 
by Gonzales-Posadas was speculative and that he had not 
established government consent or acquiescence in any past 
torture or the likelihood of it in the future.   
 
Gonzalez-Posadas timely filed the present petition 
challenging the Board’s decision.4   
                                              
4 Gonzalez-Posadas did not seek a stay of removal and 
was removed from the United States on March 28, 2014.   
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II. Discussion5 
 
Gonzalez-Posadas does not challenge the portion of 
the Board’s holding affirming that the group consisting of 
“young Honduran men who have resisted gang recruitment” 
is not a cognizable social group for purposes of withholding 
of removal.  He also does not challenge the Board’s denial of 
his application for protection under the CAT.  Instead, he 
advances two primary arguments in his petition for review.  
First, he says that the Board erred in upholding the IJ’s 
conclusion that he did not establish past persecution on 
account of his membership in a social group consisting of 
homosexual males.  Second, he argues that the Board erred in 
upholding the IJ’s conclusion that he did not establish a fear 
of future persecution on account of his sexual orientation.  
We address each of those arguments below.   
                                              
5 The Board had jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1103(g)(2) and 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(e).  We have jurisdiction 
to review final orders of the Board pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252.  When the Board relies on an IJ’s legal conclusions 
and findings of fact, we review the IJ’s decision and the 
Board’s decision.  Sandie v. Att’y Gen., 562 F.3d 246, 250 (3d 
Cir. 2009).  We must accept factual findings if supported by 
substantial evidence.  INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 
481 (1992).  Under that deferential standard, we must uphold 
the agency’s determination unless the evidence would compel 
any reasonable fact finder to reach a contrary result.  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(b)(4)(B);  Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 481 n.1; Abdille 
v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 483-84 (3d Cir. 2001).  Gonzalez-
Posadas argues that he remains eligible for withholding of 
removal despite his removal from the United States, and the 
government agrees. 
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A. Past Persecution 
 
Under section 241(b)(3)(A) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, “[t]he Attorney General may not remove an 
alien to a country if the Attorney General decides that the 
alien’s life or freedom would be threatened in that country 
because of the alien’s race, religion, nationality, membership 
in a particular social group or political opinion.”  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1231(b)(3)(A).  The alien bears the burden of proving that 
he will more likely than not face persecution on account of 
one of those protected grounds.  INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 
429-30 (1984); Senathirajah v. INS, 157 F.3d 210, 215 (3d 
Cir. 1998) (“To meet this test, the alien must demonstrate that 
there is a greater-than-fifty-percent chance of persecution 
upon his or her return.”).  Proof of past persecution raises a 
rebuttable presumption that the alien’s life or freedom would 
be threatened in the future.  8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1)(i).  
Under our cases, “‘persecution’ is an extreme concept that 
does not include every sort of treatment our society regards as 
offensive.”  Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1243 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(“[P]ersecution does not encompass all treatment that our 
society regards as unfair, unjust, or even unlawful or 
unconstitutional.”).  Rather, “persecution” encompasses only 
grave harms such as “threats to life, confinement, torture, and 
economic restrictions so severe that they constitute a threat to 
life or freedom.”  Id. at 1240.   
 
To establish eligibility for withholding of removal 
based on membership in a particular social group, an 
applicant must establish both that the group itself is properly 
cognizable as a “social group” within the meaning of the 
statute, and that his membership in the group is “one central 
reason” why he was or will be targeted for persecution.  
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Matter of C-T-L-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 341, 344-46 (BIA 2010) 
(extending the “one central reason” standard from asylum 
cases to cases involving withholding of removal).6  We are 
                                              
6 While the parties appear to agree on this point, we 
have not heretofore addressed whether the Board’s decision 
in Matter of C-T-L- properly extended the “one central 
reason” test to determinations of withholding of removal.  
Subsection 101(c) of the REAL ID Act amends section 
241(b)(3) of the INA by applying to and codifying for 
withholding of removal the same standards for sustaining the 
applicable burden of proof in terms of corroboration and 
credibility that are used for asylum adjudications under 
sections 208(b)(1)(B)(ii) and (iii) of the INA, as amended by 
section 101(a)(3) of the REAL ID Act.  REAL ID Act of 
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 101(a)(3), 119 Stat. 231 (codified 
at 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)); id. at § 101(c) (codified at 8 
U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(C)).  Prior to passage of the REAL ID 
Act in 2005, there was no statutory standard for judging 
whether an alien should be granted asylum when he was 
persecuted on account of both protected and unprotected 
grounds.  As a result, the Board and the courts formulated 
various “mixed motive” persecution tests, with this Court 
providing that an applicant needed only to show that his 
persecution was caused “at least in part” by membership in a 
protected group.  Ndayshimiye v. Att’y Gen., 557 F.3d 124, 
129 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 
also Matter of C-T-L-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 345-46 (discussing 
the various tests developed prior to the REAL ID Act).  The 
REAL ID Act supplanted that standard, requiring instead that 
an asylum applicant establish that membership in a particular 
social group “was or will be at least one central reason for 
persecuting the applicant.”  8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) 
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not free to assume that past persecution was perpetrated on 
account of a protected characteristic, such as membership in a 
particular social group.  See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 
478, 483 (1992) (stating that evidence of a persecutor’s 
motives is required).  Rather, the applicant bears the burden 
of proving that one central reason for the persecution was a 
protected characteristic.  Matter of C-T-L-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 
350.  For a protected characteristic to qualify as “one central 
reason”, it must be an essential or principal reason for the 
persecution; withholding of removal may not be granted 
when the characteristic at issue “played only an incidental, 
tangential, or superficial role in persecution.”  Ndayshimiye v. 
Att’y Gen., 557 F.3d 124, 130 (3d Cir. 2009) (discussing 
asylum).  Conflicts of a personal nature and isolated criminal 
acts do not constitute persecution on account of a protected 
characteristic.  See Shehu v. Att’y Gen., 482 F.3d 652, 657 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (concluding that no reasonable fear of persecution 
existed when gang targeted the applicant for economic gain, 
not because of his political or family affiliation); Amanfi v. 
Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 719, 727 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding no 
                                                                                                     
(emphasis added).  But the REAL ID Act did not expressly 
state whether the “one central reason” test should apply in the 
context of withholding of removal.  We believe that the 
Board’s decision in Matter of C-T-L- to extend the “one 
central reason” test to withholding of removal was sound and 
we likewise adopt that conclusion now.  In particular, we 
agree that “ʻthe language and design of the statute’ 
evidences” Congress’s intent to eliminate the confusion and 
disparity inherent in the “mixed motive” persecution tests in 
the context of both claims for asylum and claims for 
withholding of removal.  Matter of C-T-L-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 
348.   
 17 
 
reasonable fear of persecution on account of the applicant’s 
religion when past conflict was motivated by an interpersonal 
conflict and not by religious bigotry); see also Marquez v. 
INS, 105 F.3d 374, 380 (7th Cir. 1997) (“A personal dispute, 
no matter how nasty, cannot support an alien’s claim of 
asylum.”).   
 
The IJ and the Board held – and the government does 
not dispute – that Gonzalez-Posadas’s sexual orientation 
placed him in a cognizable social group.  But the IJ 
concluded, and the Board agreed, that Gonzalez-Posadas 
failed to establish past persecution because he failed to 
demonstrate that he was persecuted on account of his sexual 
orientation.7  We must determine whether substantial 
evidence supports that conclusion.   
 
Gonzalez-Posadas argues that he has shown he 
suffered “one or more incidents of persecution at the hands of 
homophobic [Mara] gang members on account of his sexual 
orientation.”  (Gonzalez-Posadas Br. at 10.)  He asserts that, 
because he credibly testified that gang members called him 
“dog,” “garbage,” “faggot,” and told him that he “should be 
dead” and that he “should not exist in this society,” he proved 
that his sexual orientation was one central reason for his 
persecution.  (Gonzalez-Posadas Br. at 15 (internal quotation 
marks omitted); A.R. at 122.)  He also points to other 
                                              
7 As noted by the government, the IJ appears to have 
conflated whether Gonzalez-Posadas had established that the 
mistreatment he suffered rose to the level of persecution with 
whether he was mistreated on account of his sexual 
orientation.  We will assume, without deciding, that the 
mistreatment rose to the level of persecution.   
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testimony which he believes resolves the issue in his favor: 
the Maras “‘would mistreat [him], they would beat [him] up – 
they said they would kill [him] if it wasn’t because [he] was 
paying them money – that someone like [him] should be 
dead.’”  (Gonzalez-Posadas Br. at 15 (alterations in original) 
(quoting A.R. at 124).)   
 
The problem with Gonzalez-Posadas’s argument is 
that it relies on a narrow and naturally one-sided 
interpretation of the record.  Despite the picture he paints, 
substantial evidence in the record – including his own prior 
statements – can be understood to show that the Maras were 
interested in him for two reasons: he had money, and he was a 
potential recruit.  For instance, when asked point-blank by the 
USCIS interviewer why the Maras threatened to harm him, 
Gonzalez-Posadas responded, “Because they wanted to steal 
from me.”  (A.R. at 247.)  In his application for withholding 
of removal, he stated, “[M]y mother and I were targets of 
extortion by the [Maras]” because the gang believed that the 
two of them received money from his sister in the United 
States.  (A.R. at 230.)  He further stated that he feared death 
and torture at the hands of the Maras because he had refused 
to join their gang, he had reported them to the police, and he 
had attempted to escape from them.  At no point in the 
application did Gonzalez-Posadas suggest that the gang had 
any interest in harming him on account of his homosexuality.   
 
To further underscore the point, when he testified 
about his interaction with the Maras when they first began 
extorting him, he did not claim that any reference to his 
sexual orientation was made; the Maras only expressed 
interest in his money.  In addition, he testified that the Maras 
also used intimidation and violence in their attempt to coerce 
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his cousins to join the gang.  He did not testify that either of 
those cousins was gay, which suggests that the Maras’ 
interest in recruiting young men, including Gonzalez-
Posadas, had nothing to do with sexual orientation.  While it 
may certainly be true that the Maras used homophobic slurs 
and sexual threats when addressing Gonzalez-Posadas, the 
record can support the conclusion that the abusive language 
was a means to an end – namely cowing Gonzalez-Posadas 
into paying them off or joining their gang.   
 
Gonzalez-Posadas focuses in his briefing on the 
actions of the Maras.  Our analysis has in turn focused on the 
Maras’ acts.  To the extent Gonzalez-Posadas has not 
abandoned reliance on the rapes committed by his cousin, 
however, we conclude that, heinous though those crimes 
were, the conclusion of the IJ that they were “isolated 
criminal acts” that were not motivated by Gonzalez-Posadas’s 
homosexuality is supported by substantial evidence.  (A.R. at 
77.)  They are therefore not a basis for a finding of past 
persecution.  See Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 494 (3d 
Cir. 2001) (“The assaults experienced by Abdille at the hands 
of two different sets of assailants could represent random 
street violence, motivated not by animosity against a 
particular ethnic group, but rather by arbitrary hostility or by 
a desire to reap financial rewards.  Such ordinary criminal 
activity does not rise to the level of persecution necessary to 
establish eligibility for asylum.”); see also Singh v. INS, 134 
F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Mere generalized lawlessness 
and violence between diverse populations, of the sort which 
abounds in numerous countries and inflicts misery upon 
millions of innocent people daily around the world, generally 
is not sufficient” to establish past persecution).   
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In short, while other interpretations of the record are 
certainly possible, substantial evidence supports the agency’s 
determination that Gonzalez-Posadas’s homosexuality was 
not one central reason for the persecution.   
 
B. Fear of Future Persecution 
 
Even if an applicant fails to prove that he suffered past 
persecution, he can still establish that “it is more likely than 
not that he … would be persecuted” in the future on account 
of a protected characteristic if he were removed.  8 C.F.R. 
§ 1208.16(b)(2); Miah v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d 434, 439 (3d Cir. 
2003).  An applicant for withholding of removal may 
demonstrate a sufficient threat of future persecution by 
showing either that it is more likely than not that he will be 
“singled out individually” for persecution on account of a 
protected basis, or that “there is a pattern or practice of 
persecution of a group of persons similarly situated” to him 
on account of a protected basis, and that he is a member of 
that group, and that his life or freedom would be more likely 
than not be threatened if he were removed.  8 C.F.R. 
§ 1208.16(b)(2)(i), (ii).  To qualify as a “pattern or practice” 
for purposes of withholding of removal, the persecution must 
be “systematic, pervasive, or organized.”8  See Lie v. 
Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 537 (3d Cir. 2005) (interpreting 
“pattern or practice” in asylum regulations).   
 
                                              
8 Because the regulatory language that Lie interpreted 
is nearly identical in both the asylum and withholding of 
removal contexts, we conclude that the test set forth for 
proving “pattern or practice” in the asylum context also 
applies to proof supporting withholding of removal.   
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Gonzalez-Posadas argues that “[t]he record 
demonstrates … [he] suffered homophobic mistreatment that 
will likely continue to worsen in the future such that it will 
rise to the level of persecution.”  (Gonzalez-Posadas Br. at 
17.)  He asserts that his own experiences bear out the cogency 
of his argument: “[h]e was raped with a knife held to his 
neck, called a faggot 20-30 times, extorted for money at 
gunpoint, beaten and threatened with death,” all allegedly 
because he was perceived as gay.  (Id.)  He also asserts that 
the mistreatment directed at him is likely to intensify because 
he is older than he was when he was previously mistreated 
and because he is now an uncloseted gay man.  Further, 
relying on the documentary evidence presented to the IJ, he 
asserts that conditions in Honduras validate his fear of future 
persecution and establish that it is more likely than not that he 
will face future persecution in Honduras based on his sexual 
orientation.   
 
Viewing the entirety of the record, however, we are 
bound to say that the agency’s determination that Gonzalez-
Posadas failed to establish that it was more likely than not he 
would be subjected to future persecution is supported by 
substantial evidence.  First, as we have already discussed, 
Gonzalez-Posadas did not establish that the Maras targeted 
him on account of his sexual orientation, nor did he show that 
the rapes he suffered by his cousin were related to his 
(Gonzalez-Posadas’s) sexual orientation.  Second, as to the 
documentary evidence of country conditions in Honduras, we 
cannot agree that the evidence compels the conclusion that 
Gonzalez-Posadas is more likely than not to suffer 
persecution on account of his sexual orientation, especially in 
light of the statements in the 2013 Human Rights Watch 
Report that the Honduran government has established a 
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special unit in the attorney general’s office to investigate 
crimes against LGBT persons and other vulnerable groups.  
While the documentary evidence does demonstrate that 
LGBT persons may face violence at the hands of their fellow 
Honduran citizens and suffer indignities and discrimination, 
the record does not compel the conclusion that there is a 
“systematic, pervasive, or organized” pattern or practice of 
persecution of LGBT persons in Honduras.  Again, there is 
more than one way to view the record before us, but we are 
required to uphold the decision of the Board when there is, as 
in this case, substantial evidence to support it.  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(b)(4)(B); Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 481.   
 
III. Conclusion 
 
Accordingly, for the reasons stated, we will deny the 
petition for review.   
